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MORAL DAMAGES
Saul Litvinoff*
TERMINOLOGY
In the French tradition, the expressions dommage moral and priju-
dice moral are commonly used to designate damage inflicted to interests
or assets that are not exactly patrimonial.' As is generally known, not all
rights are of a patrimonial nature.2 Very important ones such as family
rights or rights of personality are not regarded as part of a person's
patrimony. The infringement of such nonpatrimonial rights, however,
may give rise to claims for reparation which are clearly patrimonial
assets.' Therefore, to speak of nonpatrimonial damages is not perfectly
accurate. Nor is it entirely clear to speak of nonpecuniary damages since
damages are commonly repaired in money. From a different vantage
point, it becomes clear that the infringement of certain rights is bound to
have an impact on the emotions of the holder of such rights. That is
something clearly expressed by courts in the English-speaking world when
they refer to "mental anguish," "mental suffering," "humiliation" or
even "emotional distress." 4
There is no semantic obstacle to borrowing from the French tradition
and speaking of "moral damages" to mean damage that cannot be techni-
cally viewed as sustained by a person's patrimony, or damage to an
interest for which a current market-value cannot be readily ascertained, as
is always the case when the injury sustained consists, in whole or in part,
in the experience of a negative state of emotional distress.
With those qualifications, the expression "moral damages" will be
used in the following discussion.
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. See 7 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, TRAIT~i PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN.AIS
186 (2d ed. Esmein trans. 1954); P. WEILL, DROIT CIVIL-LES OBLIGATIONS 427
(1971).
2. See I A. YIANNOPOULOS, CIVIL LAW OF PROPERTY 218 (1966).
3. !d.
4. Westesen v. Olathe State Bank, 78 Colo. 217, 240 P. 689 (1925); Dawson v.
Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 215 Kan. 814, 529 P.2d 104 (1974); Batson v. Bean, 208
Ky. 295, 270 S.W. 801 (1925); Miholevich v. Mid-West Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 261
Mich. 495, 246 N.W. 202 (1933); Dallas v. Brown, 150 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941).
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THE PROBLEM
In the vast majority of instances the nonperformance of an obligation
results in injury to the obligee's body or property. At times, however, the
impairment affects an interest beyond the scope of the obligee's pat-
rimony, that is, the damage is of a moral nature as clarified above. The
question about recovery for such damage is closely connected to the
question whether an obligation must always have a patrimonial object. 5 As
shown elsewhere, the answer given by modern doctrine is that any interest
worthy of protection, even if not of a patrimonial nature, may be the object
of an obligation. 6 It should then follow that damages of a moral nature are
unquestionably recoverable. Indeed, there is no reason to contend that
injury to a moral interest is not a loss within the meaning of articles 1149
of the French and 1934 of the Louisiana civil codes even when that which
has been lost is a positive state of emotional gratification, or a neutral state
of emotional balance which is always better than a negative state of
distress. Even more clearly, there is a loss within the meaning of those
articles when the injury is to reputation, though when the reputation
involved is commercial good-name it is then possible to think in terms of
patrimonial injury.7 It may be said, likewise, that injury to a moral interest
can also be turned into deprivation of profit, within the meaning of the
cited articles, since a state of emotional distress may prevent gainful
activity and an injury inflicted upon a party's reputation may destroy his
expectations of actual reward or profit. Be this as it may, reparation of
such damage has presented some difficulties and given rise to some
questions.
In the matter of delict and quasi-delict, French jurisprudence has had
no hesitation in granting recovery for moral damages when those kinds of
injuries are serious and real. 8 In the matter of contract, the recovery of
5. See L. ENNECCERUS ET H. LEHMANN, RECHT DER SCHULDVERHALTNISSE 7
(15th ed. 1958); 2 B. WINSCHEID, LEHRBUCH DES PANDEKTENRECHTS § 250 (9th ed.
Kipp trans. 1963). See also I L. BARASSI, LA TEORIA GENERALE DELLE OBLIGAZIONI
60-61 (1963); F. MESSINEO, MANUALE DI DIRITTO CIVILE E COMMERCIALE, Pt. 11, at
10 (8th ed. 1952).
6. See I S. LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS 55-58 (1969).
7. See Rouen, May 27, 1844, S. 44.2.550. See also 11 G. BAUDRY-LACAN-
TINERIE ET E. BARDE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL-DES OBLI-
GATIONS 452 (2d ed. 1900).
8. See 1 L. MAZEAUD, J. MAZEAUD ET A. TUNC, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET
PRATIQUE DE LA RESPONSABILITE CIVILE DELICTUELLE ET CONTRACTUELLE 393-95
(Sth ed. 1957); 6 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 1, at 753-55; P. WEILL, supra
note 1, at 614. See also DORVILLE, DE L'INTERET MORAL DANS LES OBLIGATIONS
(1901); MANTELET, REiPARATION DU PREJUDICE MORAL (1907).
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moral damages has been subject to debate. Quite often, indeed, contract is
viewed in the context, or against the background, of interests of patrimo-
nial nature. In a natural way, that approach leads to the conclusion that the
damages sustained by the obligee as a result of the obligor's nonperform-
ance are taken into account and therefore give rise to reparation only when
they are of a pecuniary nature. Strictly adhering to this manner of rea-
soning, a good many writers have asserted that no recovery may be
granted for the nonperformance of a contractual obligation when it is
attended only by injuries of a moral nature. 9
Criticism has been voiced against that approach, however. A "mor-
al" interest is only rarely found in contract, and even more rarely does a
contract involve such an interest exclusively. In most instances it is closely
linked with an interest of a pecuniary nature. That is the case, for instance,
when an obligor must deliver a thing which, besides its value in money, is
also of a sentimental--or "moral"-value for the obligee, as where
family heirlooms such as portraits or documents, or works of art, are
involved.' 0 At times, an obligor's failure to perform may have an impact
on the obligee's credit or good name, as when a bank dishonors a check or
a bill of exchange without a valid reason. There should be little doubt that
in situations of that sort the damage inflicted upon a party's good name or
credit is immediately followed by other damage of a pecuniary nature,
especially when the party is a merchant. Nevertheless, the fact that
damage of an exclusively moral nature occurs only seldom is no justifica-
tion for a denial of recovery where such damage has been proved." It has
been said that, as shown by solutions reached in the delictual field, the law
has passed the stage where only material values were taken into account. 2
If full reparation is to be granted, as it should be, all interests of an
obligee, whatever their nature, must be protected. 13 The manner of repara-
9. 1I G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET E. BARDE, supra note 7, at 451-57; 7 T.
Huc, COMMENTAIRE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DU CODE CIVIL 209-10 (1894); 16 F.
LAURENT, PRINCIPES DE DROIT CIVIL FRAN4AIS 341-42 (2d ed. 1876); Meynial, De la
sanction civile des obligations de faire et de ne pas faire, 56 REVUE PRATIQUE DE
DROIT CIVIL FRAN(AIS 385, 440.(1884).
10. See 7 M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 1, at 187.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 2 L. MARTY ET P. RAYNAUD, DROIT CIVIL-LES OBLIGATIONS 561 (1962); I
L. MAZEAUD, J. MAZEAUD ET A. TUNC, supra note 8, at 415; 7 M. PLANIOL ET G.
RIPERT, supra note 1, at 187-88; P. WEILL, supra note 1, at 428. Of special interest
in this context is Chausse, De l'interet d'affection, 24 REVUE CRITIQUE DE LEGISLA-
TION ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 436 (1895). Chausse and Baudry-Lacantinerie engaged in
a debate now classic on the subject of reparation of moral damages. I 1 G. BAUDRY-
LACANTINERIE ET E. BARDE, supra note 7, at 451-57.
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tion is, quite certainly, pecuniary. If that were an objection, however, it
would be as valid in the delictual as in the contractual field. 4 In the one
and the other, nevertheless, the allowance of any reparation, even if
imperfect or inadequate, is better than no reparation at all.
The French jurisprudence reflects the same diversity of views. Some
decisions have rejected recovery outright when the damage is of a moral
nature exclusively. 15 Others, taking a more moderate attitude, have grant-
ed recovery for a moral injury strictly connected to other damages of
pecuniary nature. '6 Modern decisions finally have granted protection to
interests of an exclusively moral nature. 7 Thus, an actress was granted
recovery for the damage sustained when her name appeared on posters in
small-size print.' 8 Similarly, members of a deceased's family were al-
lowed to recover from an undertaker for their wounded feelings resulting
from delay in a funeral.' 9 It is possible to conclude that French courts now
take into account the moral interest of an obligee when granting recovery
for the failure to perform a contractual obligation.
At common law the situation is not essentially different. In most
cases involving breach of contract, recovery is limited under that system to
compensation for patrimonial injuries in the form of either loss sustained
or gain prevented.2" A pecuniary satisfaction for a patrimonial injury is
sufficient, it is believed, to compensate a plaintiff for his actual loss and
also for the vexation and disappointment always involved in the breach of
a contract. 2' In tort cases, however, damages for mental suffering are
14. M. PLANIOL ET G. RIPERT, supra note 1, at 188.
15. A well known decision rendered by the court of Paris on March 27, 1873,
D.P. 74.2. 129, S. 74.1.477, is indicative of this trend: A depositary failed to return a
painting. The depositor was allowed to recover the intrinsic value of the painting
but no recovery was granted for the loss of the sentimental value the painting had
for the depositor. The painting involved was a family portrait.
16. See Rouen, May 27, 1844, S. 44.2.550, involving a banker's refusal to honor
a bill of exchange though the amount of the bill was covered by funds of the drawer
in the banker's possession.
17. See P. WEILL, supra note 1, at 428.
18. Trib. com. Seine, Feb. 20, 1932, Gaz. Pal. 1932.1.895.
19. Trib. civ. Seine, Dec. 20, 1932, S. 1932.2.144.
20. See 5 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS 426 (1964); 11 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS 214
(3d ed. 1968).
21. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 20, at 426; C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE
LAW OF DAMAGES 592 (1935). In re United States, 418 F.2d 264 (1st Cir. 1969); In re
Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971), citing J. EWALT & D.
FARNSWORTH, TEXTBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 193-94 (1963) and J. JASTROW, CHARAC-
TER AND TEMPERAMENT 136-43 (1915); Rodrigues v. State, 472 P.2d 509 (Haw.
1970); Wilson v. Lund, 80 Wash. 2d 91,491 P.2d 1287 (1971); Comment, 59 GEO. L.
J. 1237 (1971).
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awarded when such suffering is the result of bodily injury.2" They are also
awarded when suffering has been caused intentionally or in a wanton or
reckless manner, as is the case in some wilful torts such as defamation,
assault and imprisonment.2 3 Only very seldom do comparable situations
appear in the contractual field.
At any rate, distinguished authority asserts that when conduct that
causes bodily harm is wrongful not because it is a breach of the general
law of tort but because it is a breach of an express contract made by the
defendant there is no reason for applying a different rule as to the damages
that can be recovered.24 Following this trend of thought, section 341 of the
Restatement of Contracts provides:
In actions for breach of contract, damages will not be given as
compensation for mental suffering, except where the breach was
wanton or reckless and caused bodily harm and where it was the
wanton or reckless breach of a contract to render a performance of
such a character that the defendant had reason to know when the
contract was made that the breach would cause mental suffering for
reasons other than mere pecuniary loss.
Even when a contract has been breached out of mere negligence
rather than wilfulness or wantonness, some courts may reach the same
results, provided the contract is such that the defendant could not have
failed to know that its breach would cause mental suffering to the other
party. The breach of a promise to marry is a typical example of such a
situation. 25 The same solution obtains in the case of contracts for the
22. Erie R. Co. v. Collins, 253 U.S. 77 (1920); Hamilan Corp. v. O'Neill, 273
F.2d 89 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. McBride, 36 F.2d 841 (6th Cir.
1930); Easton v. United Trade School Contracting Co., 173 Cal. 199, 159 P. 597
(1916); Templin v. Erkekedis, 119 Ind. App. 171, 84 N.E.2d 728 (1949); Domenico
v. Kaherl, 160 Me. 182, 200 A.2d 844 (1964); Patterson v. Blatti, 133 Minn. 23, 157
N.W. 717 (1916). See also I T. STREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 470
(1906).
23. Wilkinson v. Downton, [189712 Q.B. 57; Gadsden Gen. Hosp. v. Hamilton,
212 Ala. 531, 103 So. 553 (1925); Atlanta Hub Co. v. Jones, 47 Ga. App. 778, 171
S.E. 470 (1933); Nickerson v. Hodges, 146 La. 735, 84 So. 37 (1920); Pion v. Caron,
237 Mass. 107,129 N.E. 369 (1921); Poleski v. Polish-American Pub. Co., 245 Mich.
15, 235 N.W. 841 (1931); Kurpgeweit v. Kirby, 88 Neb. 72, 129 N.W. 177 (1910);
Leach v. Leach, I 1 Tex. Civ. App. 699, 33 S.W. 703 (1895); Salisbury v. Poulson,
51 Utah 552, 172 P. 315 (1918); Viss v. Calligan, 91 Wash. 673, 158 P. 1012 (1916).
24. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 20, at 428.
25. Hattin v. Chapman, 46 Conn. 607 (1879); Parker v. Forehand, 99 Ga. 743, 28
S.E. 400 (1896); Benson v. Williams, 239 Iowa 742, 32 N.W.2d 813 (1948); Kugling
v. Williamson, 231 Minn. 135, 42 N.W.2d 534 (1950); Klitzke v. Davis, 172 Wisc.
425, 179 N.W. 586 (1920).
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carriage or proper disposition of human bodies.2 6 Contracts for the deliv-
ery of death messages also fall in that category.2 7
It has been suggested, however, that the general practice is still to
deny damages for mental anguish:
Mental suffering is not itself a pecuniary harm; and it can
scarcely be said to be measurable at all in terms of money. Likewise,
it must be differentiated from bodily injury and from the physical
pain that a -bodily injury may cause. The exact line between mental
suffering and physical pain may be an invisible line, because the
former, as well as the latter, may well be a disturbance in the bodily
cells; but the courts have thus far made a rough practical distinction
between them, and it will continue to be made until advancing
science shows it to be ill-founded, or general dissatisfaction with
results forces its abandonment.2 8
Such a fluid stage of development of the law as to liability for mental
anguish alone has been seen to be the result of certain trends not only in
the law, but also in medicine.29 It has been stated, however, that "[t]here
is a definite trend today in the United States to give an increasing amount
of protection to the interest in freedom from emotional distress. 30
It must be said, to conclude, that whenever exemplary damages are
allowed, mental suffering is taken into account. 3 The dividing line be-
tween moral and exemplary damages is not very distinct.
THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE
Unlike the Code Napoleon, article 1934 of the Civil Code of Louisia-
na contemplates, in its third paragraph, damages of a non-patrimonial or
moral nature:
26. Owens v. Liverpool Corp., [1939] 1 K.B. 394; Brown Funeral Homes &
Ins. Co. v. Baughn, 226 Ala. 661, 148 So. 154 (1933); Carey v. Lima, Salmon &
Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1959); Louisville & N. R.R. v.
Wilson, 123 Ga. 62, 51 S.E. 24 (1905); Hale v. Bonner, 82 Tex. 33, 17 S.W. 605
(1891); Note, 1960 DUKE L.J. 135.
27. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100 Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930);
Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62 N.W. 1 (1895); Russ v.
Western Union Tel. Co., 222 N.C. 504, 23 S.E.2d 681 (1943); So Relle v. Western
Union Tel, Co., 55 Tex. 308 (1881).
28. 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 20, at 426.
29. 11 S. WILLISTON, supra note 20, at 219.
30. Kaufman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 224 F.2d 723 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 947 (1955).
31. II S. WILLSTON, supra note 20, at 215.
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Although the general rule is, that damages are the amount of the
loss the creditor has sustained, or of the gain of which he has been
deprived, yet there are cases in which damages may be assessed
without calculating altogether on the pecuniary loss, or the privation
of pecuniary gain to the party. Where the contract has for its object
the gratification of some intellectual enjoyment, whether in religion,
morality or taste, or some convenience or other legal gratification,
although these are not appreciated in money by the parties, yet
damages are due for their breach; a contract for a religious or
charitable foundation, a promise of marriage, or an engagement for a
work of some of the fine arts, are objects and examples of this rule. 32
Immediately thereafter the article contains a relevant precept as to the
manner in which such damages shall be measured:
In the assessment of damages under this rule, as well as in cases
of offenses, quasi-offenses, and quasi-contracts, much discretion
must be left to the judge or jury, while in other cases they have none,
but are bound to give such damages under the above rules as will
fully indemnify the creditor, whenever the contract has been broken
by the fault, negligence, fraud or bad faith of the debtor. 33
The English version contains a few departures from the French
original.3 4 A more accurate translation would read:
Although the general rule is that damages are the amount of the
loss the creditor has sustained, or of the gain of which he has been
deprived, yet there are cases in which damages may be granted
without reckoning them at all on any pecuniary loss or on any
32. Emphasis added. This paragraph was introduced in the revision of 1825.
There is no comparable language in the pertinent articles of the French Civil Code.
See 3 LOUISIANA LEGAL ARCHIVES pt. 11, at 1069-72 (1942).
33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1934(3).
34. The French original reads: "Quoique la r~gle gin6rale soit que les dom-
mages doivent Etre de ia perte que le criancier a iprouv6e, et du gain dont il a 6
priv6, il est des cas o6 des dommages peuvent etre accordis, sans les calculer en
aucune maniere sur la perte p6cuniaire, ou ]a privation du gain que ]a partie peut
avoir 6prouv6e. Lorsque le contrat a pour but de procurer t quelqu'un une jouiss-
ance purement intellectuelle, telle que celles qui tiennent A la religion, A la morale,
au gout, h la commodit6 ou A toute autre esp ce de satisfaction de ce genre,
quoique ces choses n'aient pas 6t6 appreci6es en argent par les parties, des dom-
mages n'en seront pas moins dus pour la violation de la convention. Un contrat, qui
a pour but une fondation religieuse ou charitable, une promesse de mariage, ou
1'entreprise de quelqu'ouvrage appartenant aux beaux arts, offre 1'example d'un cas
auquel cette regle piut s'appliquer."
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deprivation of pecuniary gain the party might have sustained. When a
contract was made for the purpose of securing to a party a purely
intellectual enjoyment, such as that related to religion, morality,
taste, personal comfort or any other kind of satisfaction of that order,
though such things were not evaluated in money by the parties,
damages are nevertheless due for breach of the obligation. A contract
the purpose of which is a religious or charitable foundation, a prom-
ise of marriage, or the undertaking to do a work in any of the fine
arts, is an example of a case where this rule can be applied. 35
Thus translated, the French text of the precept offers a wider scope
and a greater generality than are reflected in the official English version.
That difference in generality and scope is of unquestionable importance
for a correct interpretation of the precept.
The source of that rule cannot be readily ascertained. 3 6 It may be
35. Emphasis added. From a contrast of this translation with the official one it
becomes clear that rather than "some intellectual enjoyment" the French text reads
une jouissance purement intellectuelle, that is, "a purely intellectual enjoyment."
Rather than "convenience" the French text reads c6mmoditi, of which "personal
comfort" is a more accurate translation. Rather than "other legal gratification" the
French words are toute autre espice de satisfaction de ce genre, that is, "any other
kind of satisfaction of that order." Finally the official English version makes a
reference to the "object" of the contract while the French text speaks of but, that
is, end or purpose. Cf. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 436-37
(La. 1976), where a different translation, and interpretation, is made of the original
French text. In a note on that case the following restatement is proposed:
Where the purpose of motive of the contract is primarily for personal, social,
or family interest including comfort and convenience and is within the contem-
plation of the parties at the time of the contract, recovery for non-pecuniary
damages will be given; however, where the purpose of the contract is primarily
commercial, economic, or otherwise based on a pecuniary motive, recovery
will not be given for nonpecuniary damages.
See Note, 37 LA. L. REV. 625, 632 (1977).
36. It has been suggested that the rule may be traced to a passage in Domat's
work where, discussing the liability of an architect who failed to perform an
obligation to build a house for an owner who had already made a contract with a
tenant, the classical writer said that the architect was liable for three kinds of loss:
"That of the expense of rebuilding the house, the loss of the rent which the landlord
ought to have had, and that of the damages which the landlord will be liable for to
the tenant for disappointing him of his house." I J. DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN ITS
NATURAL ORDER 776 (Cushing ed. Strahan trans. 1850) (emphasis added). See
Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Louisiana Projet of 1823: A General Analytical
Survey, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1, 80 (1972). See also Comment, Damages Ex Contractu"
Recovery of Nonpecuniary Damages for Breach of Contract Under Louisiana Civil
Code Article 1934, 48 TUL. L. REV. 1160, 1173 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Damages
Ex Contractu]. Though the English translation of Domat's passage seems to sug-
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possible however to trace it to a passage by Toullier where the French
commentator most emphatically supports the view that the breach of a
promise of marriage should give rise to damages, in spite of the difficulty
that might be found in assessing them, a view he expounded against the
strong current of opinion to the contrary which prevailed at the time. 7 For
Toullier, the matter could not be left outside the scope of operation of
general principle. Since the failure to perform any obligation to do gives
rise to damages and a promise of marriage entails such an obligation to do,
damages are owed for the breach of such a promise .38 For that writer,
then, what mattered as a logical antecedent for the granting of damages
was the breach of the obligation and not the kind of expectation the
unrendered performance was supposed to fulfill. The same reasoning is
perfectly applicable to the breach of an obligation to give, which Toullier
could not have taken into account in that passage because he was dealing
with obligations which cannot be enforced through specific performance,
as in the typical case of a promise of marriage. 39
INTERPRETATION
There can be no doubt that, for purposes of the third paragraph of
article 1934 of the Louisiana Civil Code, the loss of aesthetic gratification
resulting from the breach of a contract to do a work in any of the fine arts,
or the loss of spiritual satisfaction resulting from the breach of a contract
made in contemplation of a religious or charitable purpose, is a loss within
the scope of the initial paragraph of the same article.40 Likewise, the
frustration of expectations of obtaining satisfactions or gratifications of the
kind contemplated in the third paragraph must be considered in the same
gest itself as a possible source of Civil Code article 1934(3) the French original does
not, as it reads, in the pertinent part: "et celle des dommages et interits qu 'il devra h
ce locataire, " that is, "and the damages he will have to pay to the tenant." There is
no mention of "disappointment" in the French text. 2 OEUVRES COMPLETES DE J.
DOMAT, Pt. 11, at 127 (Remy ed. 1835).
37. See 3 C. TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRAN4AIS 329-40 (1833).
38. Id. at 435. See also 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 6, at 303-24.
39. Id. at 298-303.
40. The expression "intellectual enjoyment" must be interpreted according to
ideas prevailing at the time that language was introduced into the Louisiana Civil
Code. It means, no doubt, the appreciation of values other than economic. Through
semantic evolution, such an enjoyment would nowadays be termed "emotional"
rather than "intellectual," since the psychological faculties of "thought," on the
one hand, and "feeling" on the other are more carefully separated now. See J.
CHAPLIN & T. KRAWIEC, SYSTEMS AND THEORIES OF PSYCHOLOGY 271-308, 357-80
(1960); E. HILGARD & R. ATKINSON, INTRODUCTION TO PSYCHOLOGY 365-95, 1963-
86 (4th ed. 1967); N. MUNN, THE EVOLUTION AND GROWTH OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR
409-76 (2d ed. 1965).
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category as a deprivation of profit under the initial paragraph of article
1934. Since profit is conceptually very close to benefit, and since the third
paragraph of article 1934 is concerned with nonpecuniary benefits, that
conclusion is warranted.
The Louisiana Civil Code has expressly envisaged in this manner the
reparation of damage of a nonpatrimonial nature. The moral interest of
parties to contracts has been thus protected. Furthermore, the two ele-
ments of damage, damnum emergens and lucrum cessans, with the
modifications necessitated by such a peculiar matter, have been taken into
account.
41
A cursory glance at the original French text suffices to support the
conclusion that the third paragraph of article 1934 was conceived in terms
of wide generality. An expectation of "intellectual" enjoyment is protect-
ed not only when it relates to religion, morality, taste or personal comfort,
but also when it derives from any other kind of satisfaction of that order.
As a consequence, "intellectual" enjoyment also falls within the scope of
that rule when it derives from the fulfillment of an interest in the advance-
ment of science, or the betterment of society, or the preservation of the
environment, since all these are simply other kinds of satisfaction of that
order.
It is not only promises of marriage, or contracts having as a purpose a
religious or charitable foundation or an undertaking to do a work in any of
the fine arts, that are comprised within the purview of the rule, since such
contracts are mere examples of the cases to which the rule can be applied.
Nevertheless, that paragraph of article 1934 gives rise to the question
whether, to warrant application of the rule, the contract must have been
made for the exclusive purpose of securing intellectual enjoyment to the
party, or whether the application of the rule is warranted also when the
contract, besides securing intellectual enjoyment, was made for another
purpose also. 42 No doubt, the examples offered in the paragraph itself are
of contracts where intellectual enjoyment seems to be the exclusive pur-
pose, as in the case of a contract with an artist. Such enjoyment, however,
may very well be expected from the proper performance of a contract not
exclusively made for such a purpose. Thus, a party buying a spacious and
well-appointed house may do so as a good investment in protection of his
economic interest, but he doubtless also anticipates enjoyment of the
comfort such a place offers as a residence for himself and his family. 43 A
41. See 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 6, at 338-39.
42. See Damages Ex Contractu, supra note 36.
43. See Melson v. Woodruff, 23 So. 2d 364 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1945). See also
Arquembourg v. Bourque, 243 So. 2d 92 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1971).
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party buying a luxury automobile pursues other ends than the mere
satisfaction of his transportation needs. Two reasons support a broad
rather than a narrow interpretation of the language.
In the first place, the third paragraph of article 1934 speaks of a
contract made for the purpose of securing to a party a purely intellectual
enjoyment. It does not speak of a contract made for the exclusive purpose
of securing such enjoyment. Exclusivity of the purpose may not then be
read into the legal text; to do so would amount to alteration of the text for
the alleged purpose of pursuing its spirit, which is in violation of the
principle that governs interpretation when the law is clear.' As the
drafters of the French text took care to write the adverb "purely" before
the adjective "intellectual," so they would have written the adjective
"exclusive" before the noun "purpose" had they so intended. The situa-
tions named in the third paragraph of article 1934, as its own language
clearly states, are mere examples of cases where the rule can be applied.
To achieve their illustrative purpose, examples must be clear, definite and
simple. That is the reason no doubt that prompted the redactors to select
such examples. By definition, however, examples do not exclude other
instances of the matter exemplified. In sum, that paragraph should be
read, and it does actually read, to indicate that damages for breach may be
recovered even when a contract has no other purpose than the satisfaction
of a noneconomic interest. Such a situation was chosen as an example
because it is the opposite extreme to another where the only purpose is
satisfaction of an economic order, as in the case of a sale between
merchants where the vendee buys for the purpose of reselling at a profit,
the most typical situation where damages arise. 45 Within such extremes
there is a great variety of intermediate situations that cannot be regarded as
falling outside the operation of the rule here discussed.
In the second place, a different conclusion as to the scope of the
paragraph would leave a residuum of uncovered situations where the
interest of an obligee would not be adequately protected, to the detriment
of fairness. An example may contribute some clarity. If a party, for
reasons other than 'pleasure, needs to cross the North Atlantic and chooses
so to do in the first class of a luxury liner, he is not only endeavoring to
fulfill his need of transportation related to his business, that is, an econom-
ic interest, but also to indulge in the comfort traditionally enjoyed by
travelers in that category, that is, an "intellectual" enjoyment in the
words of article 1934. Assuming now that because of a breach of the
44. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 13.
45. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934(1).
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contract by the steamship line he is forced, after departure, to travel
steerage, it would be grossly unfair to grant him as recovery just the
difference in the price of passage. Moreover, no reasonable court would
deny him recovery for the inconvenience suffered.46 In Louisiana, the
third paragraph of article 1934 of the Civil Code would furnish all
necessary grounds for such recovery. A different conclusion would entire-
ly disregard the obligee's motive, his reason for promising his own
counterperformance, that is, the cause of his obligation which is an
indispensable requirement for a valid contract in Louisiana law. 47
So far, the examples utilized involve the frustration of expected
enjoyment, which is similar to the deprivation of expected material gain as
an element of damages. The solution should not be different, however,
when the breach causes an actual loss consisting in the negative alteration
or dissipation of the obligee's emotional balance through mortification or
unusual vexation, even though the contract was not intended to secure for
him, in whole or in part, any particular intellectual enjoyment. 48 A
different conclusion would introduce an unwarranted limitation into the
notion of loss as an element of damages.
Accordingly, "humiliation," "embarrassment," "emotional dis-
tress," "mental anguish" and comparable expressions intended to name a
detriment of a peculiar kind, are merely descriptive of negative emotions
46. Consider in this connection a decision rendered by the commercial tribunal
of Toulouse on July 1, 1889, D. 1891.3.39, recognizing the inconvenience and
frustration of passengers of a train who were transported in freight-wagons. See
also a decision rendered by the Seine court on October 10, 1903, Gaz. Pal. 1903, 2e.
sem., 606, recognizing the humiliation and inconvenience of passengers who were
crammed into a coach too small for their number.
47. See I S. LITVINOFF, supra note 6, at 388-94.
48. Jiles v. Venus Community Center Benev. Mut. Aid Assn., 191 La. 803, 186
So. 342 (944) (defendant corporation failed to provide medical services called for
in the contract which resulted in the death of plaintiff's daughter; mental anguish as
a distinct element of damages was found by the court); Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La.
1030, 34 So. 66 (1903) (breach of a contract for a bride's trousseau resulted in
recovery for humiliation and mental anguish); Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co.,
135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1961) (defendant's inability to supply information
on the type of poison used violated an implied provision in an extermination
contract and delayed toxicity treatments for plaintiff's child who had ingested some
of the poison; the parents were awarded compensation for mental suffering);
Mitchell v. Shreveport Laundries, Inc., 61 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952)
(breach of a contract to clean a groom's suit resulted in humiliation and mental
suffering damage especially since because of his large size he was also unable to
purchase a replacement suit in time for the wedding). Arguably, Vogel v. Saenger
Theatres, Inc., 207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d 189 (1945), contained a contract for intellectu-
al gratification; clearly however plaintiff did not recover moral damages because of
the nature of the contract but rather because of the nature of the breach.
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attending the frustration of certain expectations or the impairment of a
state of normal adjustment to circumstances. 49 Moral damage is an
expression general enough to encompass all kinds of such negative emo-
tions. When such emotions are inflicted as the result either of a breach of
contract or a delict, moral damages is an apt designation for the pertinent
recovery.
LOUISIANA JURISPRUDENCE
Concerning the recovery of moral damages, Louisiana courts have
said, at times, that "[w]here an object, or the exclusive object, of a
contract, is physical gratification (or anything other than intellectual
gratification) nonpecuniary damages as a consequence of nonfulfillment
of that object are not recoverable. "50 In spite of the courts' awareness of
differences between the French and English texts of the third paragraph of
article 1934, that conclusion is based solely on a reading of the English
version. For that reason, such damages were denied when sought as the
result of excessive delay in the repair of a car. 5' For the same reason, that
kind of recovery was denied when requested as a consequence of the
breach of a contract to repair a house. 52
49. Westesen v. Olathe State Bank, 78 Colo. 217, 240 P. 689 (1925); Dawson v.
Associates Fin. Serv. Co., 215 Kan. 814, 529 P.2d 104 (1974); Batson v. Bean, 208
Ky. 295, 270 S.W. 801 (1925); Miholevich v. Mid-West Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 261
Mich. 495, 246 N.W. 202 (1933); Dallas v. Brown, 150 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. Civ. App.
1941).
50. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433, 437 (La. 1976)
(emphasis added). See, however, the noteworthy dissenting views:
There is no logical reason to allow recovery of such damages when property is
involved in cases delineated as "tort," and yet deny recovery of similar dam-
ages when property is involved (as in this case), simply because the cause of
action is delineated as "contract." Both involve a duty and a breach. Louisi-
ana employs fact pleading. A plaintiff need only state facts, which, if true,
authorize recovery . . . . In the instant case, plaintiff has proved, to the
satisfaction of the trier of fact, that she suffered inconvenience, distress and
aggravation because of defendant's breach of duty. She should recover there-
fore.
Id. at 439 (Dixon, J., dissenting). See also Stephenson v. Smith, 337 So. 2d 570 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1976) (asserting that awards for inconvenience, harassment and mental
anguish are authorized by article 1934(3) of the Louisiana Civil Code).
51. Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 433 (La. 1976); Tauzin v.
Sam Broussard Plymouth, Inc., 283 So. 2d 266 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); Moreau v.
Marler Ford Co., 282 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973); DiGiovanni v. April, 261
So. 2d 360 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972); Aiken v. Moran Motor Co., 165 So. 2d 662 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1964); Cadillac Service Garage v. Shushan, 10 La. App. 761, 123 So.
175 (1929).
52. Sahuc v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 320 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1963);
Rigaud v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 236 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1970); Baker
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On another occasion, nevertheless, dealing with the breach of a
contract for the sale of a home, a Louisiana court said:
The contract had for its object the gratification of some intellectual
taste and convenience on the part of the [plaintiffs], and it was
reasonably within the knowledge of the defendant and the contempla-
tion of the parties that this home was being bought by the [plaintiffs]
not with the idea and purpose of an investment or for pecuniary gain,
but primarily for the purpose of securing a home which was espe-
cially suited to their taste and convenience.5 3
Where the breach involved was of a contract to build a house, the
Louisiana court said: "We believe that a contract for the construction of a
home . . . has as its object the convenience of the owner within the
meaning and intendment of the phrase 'or some convenience' as used in
Paragraph 3, Article 1934, LSA-R.C.C. entitling the owner of a resi-
dence to damages for inconvenience resulting from a contractor's breach
of the obligation . . . ." A more flexible interpretation of the pertinent
rule has thus been made in those cases, as it.was applied to contracts not
exclusively made for the purpose of securing an intellectual enjoyment for
a party. In that vein, damages for humiliation were granted to a bride
whose wedding-dress was not made of the right length; the bride also
recovered for disappointment owing to the late delivery of the rest of her
trousseau. 5 Damages for humiliation were granted to an invalid who,
having bought the required ticket, was refused admission to a theater for
reasons related to his condition.5 6 Even in a contractual situation entirely
v. Stamps, 82 So. 2d 858 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955); Lillis v. Anderson, 21 So. 2d 389
(La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945).
53. Melson v..Woodruff, 23 So. 2d 364, 366 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1945). See also
Meyer v. Succession of McClellan, 30 So. 2d 788 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1947).
54. Jack v. Henry, 128 So. 2d 62, 72 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1961). Seealso Daquano
v. Brady, 242 So. 2d 302 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1970); Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, Inc.,
207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d 189 (1945); O'Meallie v. Moreau, 116 La. 1020, 41 So. 243
(1906).
55. Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903). See also Mitchell v.
Shreveport Laundries, Inc., 61 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952) (plaintiff re-
covered for humiliation suffered as a result of a breach of contract to clean a suit to
be worn at a wedding).
56. See Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, Inc., 207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d 189 (1945).
Though some intellectual enjoyment is expected by a theater-goer, it is noteworthy
that damages were granted not for the frustration of such expectation but for the
humiliation and embarrassment suffered by plaintiff when rejected because of his
physical condition. For that reason, this decision may not be taken as an example of
strict interpretation of Civil Code article 1934(3). In this connection the court said:
"In Louisiana consideration is to be given not only to pecuniary factors, but also to
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unrelated to any sort of intellectual enjoyment, damages for mental an-
guish were granted to a plaintiff whose son underwent great suffering and
danger in connection with defendant's performance of that contract .
57
GUIDE FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE RULE
The cursory review of the Louisiana jurisprudence just made shows
some uncertainty and, at times, some contradiction. That is warranted, to
an extent, by the manner in which the pertinent rule has been inserted in a
very comprehensive article dealing with damages and also by the language
and examples chosen by the lawmaker. Such hesitation and contradiction
may be avoided, however, if certain steps are taken to determine whether a
particular situation calls for the application of the rule. It is undisputed that
there is always some frustration or vexation whenever an obligor fails to
perform a contractual obligation. Nevertheless, not every breach of con-
tract gives rise to moral damages. In the first place, parties to a contract
reciprocally owe a certain cooperation, a duty of tolerance, based on social
solidarity, that should suffice as a basis for the understanding that a
recovery of damages is only remedial, and that absolute compensation for
all sorts of loss is not possible.58 Thus, in the case of a regular commercial
contract, a buyer who intended to resell at a profit the goods he ordered
will be disappointed, and perhaps exasperated, by the non-delivery or
untimely delivery of such goods. His contractual interest, however, was of
intellectual or mental elements in connection with the last of which recovery for
humiliation and embarrassment is allowed, these constituting actual and legal dam-
ages. The prevailing common-law rule, on the other hand, does not recognize
mental suffering from humiliation as an element of damage." Id. at 845-46, 22 So.
2d at 192. See also Damages Ex Contractu, supra note 36, at 1169. In a comparable
context, a decision by the court of Rennes on December 13, 1904, D.1905.2.430,
granted damages for mental anguish to the bereaved relatives of a deceased person
who was refused interment in a municipal cemetery on grounds that he had com-
mitted suicide. A decision of the court of Paris of October 21, 1902, D.1903.2.121,
recognized the humiliation of a widow in whose favor a charitable collection was
undertaken without her consent. In both cases the ground for decision is article
1382 of the French Civil Code, the equivalent of Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.
57. In Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1961), plaintiff's son had ingested a poisonous substance utilized by defendant's
insured while performing a contract with plaintiff. When asked to disclose the
nature of the poison so that the son could be accordingly treated, defendant's
insured was unable to do so. See Stone, Louisiana Tort Doctrine: Emotional
Distress Occasioned by Another's Peril, 48 TUL. L. REV. 782 (1974) where the
suggestion is made that, in that case, proper recovery is in tort. But see Warr v.
Kemp, 208 So. 2d 570 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1%8) and Laplace v. Minks, 174 So. 2d 895
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1965) where the contract approach is asserted.
58. See 6 R. DEMOGUE, TRAITE DES OBLIGATIONS EN GENERAL 17-21 (1931); 2 S.
LITVINOFF, supra note 6, at 9.
19771
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
an economic nature and the damages he will recover, for the actual loss he
sustained and for the profit of which he has been deprived, will protect,
precisely, that economic interest.59 As a person in business he knew that
matters of emotional gratification remained outside the contractual field.
In the second place, there is always an assumption of a certain degree of
risk in all fields of human endeavor and no recovery may be granted for
any loss entailed by such risk. 6° Finally, under such circumstances, there
should be little doubt that where the objective is economic gain, vexation
or disappointment is an indirect consequence of the breach, not recover-
able when the obligor is in good faith. 61
For a breach to give rise to moral damages, then, either the contract
or the breach must offer peculiar features, or must occur in a context of
peculiar circumstances. Whether the rule allowing recovery for such
damages is applicable depends, therefore, on a close examination of the
purpose of the contract, the nature of the breach, and the special circum-
stances surrounding one or the other.
Purpose of the Contract
When the breached contract is of the same kind as those offered as
examples by the redactors of the third paragraph of article 1934 of the
Louisiana Civil Code, there can be no difficulty in the outright application
of the rule. That is, when a contract is made for the sole purpose of
gratifying a non-economic interest, as in the case of a promise of mar-
riage, or a contract for a work in any of the fine arts, recovery must be
granted for the frustration of the obligee's expectation of intellectual
enjoyment, as tle article has it. Louisiana courts have shown no hesitation
in granting recovery for moral damages in such cases, in protection of the
interest of the disappointed obligee, an interest which, by hypothesis, is
exclusively non-economic. 62
59. See LA. Civ. CODE art. 1934(1).
60. Compare 6 R. DEMOGUE, supra note 58, at 284; see also 5 A. CORBIN,
supra note 20, at 426.
61. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1934(1).
62. See Johnson v. Levy, 122 La. 118,47 So. 422 (1908) (plaintiff was accorded
the right to sue her departed fiance's succession for his breach of promise to marry
her alleging "social ostracism and disgrace" suffered by herself and her child);
Smith v. Braun, 37 La. Ann. 225 (1885) (the action for breach of promise to marry
was held to be in form ex contractu); Morgan v. Yarborough, 5 La. Ann. 316 (1850)
(holding that under article 1928 of the 1825 Civil Code-7-corresponding to present
article 1934-reciprocal promises of marriage constitute a legal contract and the
party reneging is liable in damages). But compare Daigle v. Fournet, 141 So. 2d 406
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1962) (defendant was not entitled to damage for breach of promise
to marry since defendant herself broke the engagement).
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That non-economic interest, or expectation of intellectual enjoyment,
must also be protected, however, when it is not the sole or exclusive
purpose of the contract, lest, as already explained, the scope of operation
of the rule be unwarrantedly curtailed. In that context, Louisiana decisions
allowing moral damages for the breach of contracts to buy a house or to
build one are praiseworthy for establishing the right and fair solution.
63
For the same reason, Louisiana decisions denying that kind of recovery for
the breach of a contract to repair a home must be criticized. 64 The same
criticism must be addressed to decisions barring damages for inconveni-
ence resulting from frustration in the use of an automobile. As shown
above, an automobile may be intended to gratify an interest other than the
mere need of transportation. When the purchaser of an automobile com-
plains of a breach of the warranty of fitness, the determination of his
frustrated expectations must be made according to the kind, price and
intended use of the thing. Clearly enough, a modest delivery-van will be
used for a purpose quite different from a luxury sedan. Nevertheless, some
convenience other than just physical transportation is expected from the
use of even a modest family car. With a natural difference of degree, then,
that non-economic interest merits the protection afforded by the lawmaker
in the third paragraph of article 1934.
That the non-economic interest involved in such a situation must be
protected seems quite clear. The frustration of the pertinent expectation is
a different matter, however. As explained above, not every degree of
disappointment or vexation may be taken into account. A certain amount
63. See Daguano v. Brady, 242 So. 2d 302 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1970) (after the
sale of a house but before plaintiff could move in, defendant and her daughter
destroyed much of the interior thus causing plaintiff great mental distress); Jack v.
Henry, 128 So. 2d 62 (La. App. ist Cir. 1961) (damages for discomfort and
inconvenience were awarded on plaintiff's failure to perform satisfactorily a
contract for the construction of a house); Melson v. Woodruff, 23 So. 2d 364 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1945) (defendant, after contracting to sell a home to plaintiff sold the
house to another and plaintiff was granted damages for disappointment and incon-
venience).
64. See Sahuc v. United States Fidelity and Guar. Co., 320 F.2d 18 (5th Cir.
1%3) (moral damages are not recoverable for breach of a contract to install a hot
water heater); Regaud v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 235 So. 2d 916 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1970) (damages for inconvenience would not be awarded where failure to inspect
for termite infestation resulted in termite damage to a family residence); Baker v.
Stamps, 82 So. 2d 858 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1955) (damages for inconvenience and
mental anguish in breach of contract to renovate a bathroom were refused); Lillis v.
Anderson, 21 So. 2d 389 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1945) (damages for mental anguish
were denied in breach of a contract to repair a house).
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of risk is always assumed. Thus, if under the warranty of fitness a car is
taken to be repaired, the deprivation of the enjoyment of its use for the
reasonable time such repairs may take is that sort of anticipated risk.65
Implied in the cooperation that parties to a contract reciprocally owe is the
purchaser's duty to understand that automobiles are not perfect. It is
different when the repairs take an unreasonable or inordinate time. 66 In
this case, it is unquestionable that the obligee's inconvenience and vexa-
tion, beyond the anticipated amount, are a foreseen consequence of the
breach as the obligor cannot be unaware that his delay is bound to have
such an effect on the obligee. It is also different when the breach is
incurred in bad faith, as when the seller knew of the defects of the
automobile or misrepresented the state of the thing. 67 When this is the
case, the purchaser's inconvenience and vexation, even though perhaps
unforeseen by the seller, are doubtless direct consequences of the
breach.68
65. See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 2476, 2520, 253 1, the latter as amended by 1974 La.
Acts, No. 673.
66. But see Meador v. Toyota of Jefferson, Inc., 332 So. 2d 422 (La. 1976) (no
recovery of damages for loss of use, aggravation, distress or inconvenience even
though defendant delayed five months in making repairs on wrecked automobile);
Moreau v. Marler Ford Co., 282 So. 2d 852 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973) (in an action for
specific performance of a sale of a truck, plaintiff was entitled to diminution in
value of the vehicle, but damages for humiliation, anxiety and inconvenience
associated with deprivation of use were disallowed); DiGiovanni v. April, 261 So.
2d 360 (La. App. I st Cir. 1972) (no damages for inconvenience and loss of use of an
auto due to replacement of the engine, which was necessitated by service station
operator negligence, where the owner had sustained no actual expense or pecuniary
loss other than repair costs); Cadillac Service Garage v. Shushan, 123 So. 175 (1929)
(defendant was entitled to recover only the diminution in value of his auto caused
by plaintiff's unreasonable delay in making repairs).
. 67. In Tauzin v. Sam Broussard Plymouth, Inc., 283 So. 2d 266 (1973), plaintiff
sued in redhibition to rescind the sale of a car represented as new though it was not
and which defendant knew had been previously damaged in an accident and re-
paired. Despite defendant's evident bad faith the court awarded only a reduction in
price, perhaps because the only defect was the auto's lack of "newness," and
refused to award damages for embarrassment, mental anguish or suffering. In Aiken
v. Moran Motor Co., 165 So. 2d 662 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1974), an action in
redhibition for rescission of the sale of a "like new" demonstrator auto resulted in
judgment for plaintiff in view of defendant's misrepresentations and bad faith, but
no recovery for damages for worry, inconvenience and annoyance was permitted.
See Sunseri v. Westbank Motors, Inc., 228 La. 370, 82 So. 2d 43 (1955); Johnson v.
Heller, 33 So. 2d 776 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1948); Cockrell v. Capital City Auto Co., 3
La. App. 385 (1926).
68. Courts should not fail to take into account that, even when granted for
vexation or mental suffering, damages still are foreseen or unforeseen under article
1934(1).
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So far, however, Louisiana courts have not made that kind of analysis
in situations involving automobiles. In one decision it was said that
"[w]ith regard to the award for worry, inconvenience and annoyance,
unless these items can be translated into a calculable pecuniary loss, as for
example where the buyer is required to rent a car to use in place of the
defective vehicle, no amount may be recovered therefor. This case does
not come under the exceptions of LSA-C.C. Article 1934, subd. 3.''69
That approach is not correct. If another car is rented to substitute for the
defective one, annoyance and inconvenience are thereby prevented and the
problem disappears, though the decision does not say that recovery of such
expense would have been granted had it been incurred. Further, if the
court is deterred by the difficulties involved in the pecuniary calculation of
such a loss, that obstacle is expressly eliminated in the last part of the third
paragraph of article 1934 where great discretion is allowed to a court in the
assessment of damages of that kind.
A more accurate analysis of the interests involved, a better determi-
nation of the elements falling within the contractual field in each particular
situation and a more definite understanding of the true scope of the rule,
which includes the discretion allowed to the court, would lead to fairer
solutions. 70
69. Aiken v. Moran Motor Co., 165 So. 2d 662, 667 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1964).
70. A correct analysis of circumstances as unusual as they are dramatic can be
found in Hoffman v. All Star Ins. Corp., 288 So. 2d 388 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974),
where the court reached the conclusion that mental anguish suffered while an
ordeal is in progress is legally compensable. Plaintiff invited three friends along on a
fishing trip to the Gulf aboard his new boat constructed by defendant's insured.
While 15 to 20 miles away from shore, the motor failed and the boat was found to be
taking water. In addition, the bilge pump became inoperative because of the water
and all aboard began to bail manually. One member of the party became afflicted
with chest pains and feared a heart attack, another was so stricken with mal de mer
as to be of no assistance whatsoever. After 4 hours of constant fear of drowning,
the boat having drifted within sight of an oil rig, plaintiff tied a rope about his waist,
swam through shark-inhabited waters towing the craft, and shinnied up a barnacle-
encrusted piling to the floor of the platform, sustaining "extensive painful and ugly
cuts over a great part of his body." The Coast Guard later effected rescue and this
suit was filed for the purchase price of the vessel, loss of use of the boat, physical
injuries with attendant mental anguish and the great mental anguish and fear of
death while the ordeal was in progress. On the product liability action the court
found that the rationale of Media Pro. Consult., Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N.A.,
Inc., 262 La. 80, 262 So. 2d 377 (1972) applied and that a purchaser could not be
deprived of the warranty of reasonable fitness for intended use, provided in articles
2475 and 2476 of the Louisiana Civil Code, without an express waiver. The recov-
ery of purchase price was thus based on contractual grounds but unfortunately the
1977]
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Commercial Contracts
It would follow that when a contract is of a nature that excludes any
non-economic interest, as in the case of a commercial or business contract,
recovery of moral damages may not be granted. Though that conclusion is
correct in general terms, attention must be paid to special elements present
in unusual situations. Thus, even when a contract has been entered into by
merchants in the course of their business activity and in the sole contem-
plation of profit, moral damages must be awarded when the obligor's
breach results in an injury to the obligee's reputation, commercial good
name or prestige, as such an injury effects an unquestionable negative
impact on the obligee's future business and expectation of profit. That is a
situation where frustration of a non-economic interest is closely connected
to actual pecuniary loss. It must be remembered here that even those
French writers who are opposed to the granting of recovery for moral
damages have nevertheless recognized that such damages must be award-
ed in that sort of case. 7
Significant language found in some Louisiana decisions furnishes
adequate grounds for the conclusion that damages resulting from injury to
reputation may be recovered when proved.72 The same conclusion has
court did not elaborate on the source, whether contractual or in tort, of the recovery
by plaintiff Hoffman for physical injuries, fear and mental anguish. The fact that
the other plaintiffs recovered $1,500-$2,000 each for loss of earnings and mental
anguish coupled with plaintiff's argument to the jury based upon In re Sincere
Navigation Corp., 329 F. Supp. 652 (E.D. La. 1971) suggest a tort analysis, but this
remains uncertain.
71. See I G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET E. BARDE, supra note 7, § 481. Baudry-
Lacantinerie's view of French Civil Code Article 1149 (Louisiana Civil Code article
1934 but without the provision for contracts for intellectual gratification) has been
contrasted with the view of Chausse, a writer of the same period. See note 13,
supra. Thus in the case of a party who, prior to leaving town for a holiday,
deposited a very old and faded photograph (of small value) with someone for
safekeeping, and upon her return found the photograph destroyed because of the
depositary's fault or breach of contract, a strict view of the French article would
allow only recovery of the value of the photograph since recovery of more would
result in unjust enrichment to the party and an assessment of punitive damages
against the depositary; whereas the more liberal view would assert the party at fault
should be liable for all damages, moral ones included, and no unjust enrichment
would occur since the party would have preferred performance of the contract, and
damages are awarded for a loss which is actual, albeit difficult to ascertain.
72. In Dugue v. Levy, 114 La. 21, 37 So. 995 (1904), defendant who had hired
plaintiff, a contractor, tore down a partly completed building and discarded the
rubble. Plaintiff was unable to recover loss of credit and damages to his reputation
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obtained where the injury to reputation, together with embarrassment and
humiliation, was the result of a malicious attachment of property. 73 Dam-
ages have also been awarded for the failure to list a telephone number in a
directory. 74 It is beyond doubt that where commerce or the professions are
involved, such a listing offers features that bring it very close to the notion
of reputation. Though damages must be proved in cases of injury to
because the majority of the court found that defendant had the legal right to cancel
the contract. It seems plain however that defendant's breach was calculated to
injure plaintiff's business reputation and that a vindictive breach could well cause
actual humiliation and mental suffering. In Noyes v. F.A. Noullet & Co., 118 La.
888, 43 So. 539 (1907), the court rejected defendant's reconventional demand for
$5,000 in damages due to injury to defendant's reputation and business resulting
from plaintiff's defective execution of the contract, apparently not because of a
general impediment to recovery, but because the court only found "no sufficient
evidence to warrant a judgment." In Whitney v. Parish of Vernon, 126 La. 13, 52
So. 176 (1910), recovery of damages to plaintiff's reputation was denied based on a
prior invalid contract. In dicta the court asserted that even if the contract had been
valid plaintiff would not have been able to recover since it did not appear in what
respect he had been damaged in his reputation. Plaintiff would have failed then not
for inability to obtain non-pecuniary damages, but for failure of proof of loss. See
also Enders v. Skannal, 35 La. Ann. 1000 (1883) (plaintiff recovered for "outrage to
his feelings" after defendant's vicious breach of contract even though only plain-
fiff's employees, and not plaintiff himself, were threatened).
73. In American Steel Bldg. Co. v. Brezner, 158 So. 2d 623 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1963), plaintiff sued on a writ of attachment to force quick payment of a claim in
full, despite offsets claimed by defendant. An award of $2,000 to defendant was
sustained on appeal for "humiliation, inconvenience and harassment" in view of
the fact that, because of its rarity, the attachment received widespread notice in the
construction industry in which defendant was engaged, coupled with plaintiff's bad
faith. Despite the existence of a contract between the parties, the court's decision is
couched in the language of tort and seems to indicate that the damages were
awarded because of the malicious bringing of the suit. Citing General Motors
Acceptance Corp. v. Sneed, 167 La. 432, 119 So. 417 (1929), the court found that
when the plaintiff "makes use of this powerful legal weapon he must be ready to
respond in damages if it be found that the writ was wrongfully used," thereby
affirming the tort notion here.
74. See Loridans v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 172 So. 2d 323 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1965) (a $1,000 award for failure to list plaintiff's attorney's name in his professional
capacity under the title "Attorneys" in the yellow pages of the local directory was
sustained as within the trial judge's discretion under Louisiana Civil Code article
1934(3)); Mayeux, Bennett, Hingle Ins. Agency, Inc. v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co.,
148 So. 2d 771 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) (even though plaintiff agency was unable to
establish loss caused by failure to list its name in the telephone directory, the court
sustained an award of $2,500 in view of the fact that its business was conducted
almost entirely by telephone); Scheinuk The Florist, Inc. v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 128 So. 2d 683 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1961) (failure to list plaintiff's name in the
white pages of the phone book resulted in $1,500 recovery).
1977]
22 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38
reputation, it must be kept in mind that courts enjoy great discretion in this
respect. 7
Nature of the Breach
Whatever its nature, regardless of whether it was made for the
exclusive or inclusive purpose of securing any intellectual enjoyment to
the obligee, a contract may be breached by an obligor in a manner
calculated to inflict grief, vexation or inconvenience on the other party, as
in the case of a vendor who, before delivery, destroys on purpose the
interior of the house he has contracted to sell.76 In the terms of article
1934(l) of the Louisiana Civil Code, such breach is "designed" and
prompted by "ill will." That is to say, a breach incurred in bad faith
makes the obligor liable for all the direct consequences. Since the mental
suffering of the obligee is intended by the obligor in such a case, that
damage is obviously a direct consequence of the breach, in the terms of
article 1934(2). Further, as an obligor in bad faith is liable for all direct
consequences of his breach even when unforeseen, for greater reason he
must be liable for direct consequences that must be regarded as foreseen
because they were deliberately intended.
It clearly follows that whenever a breach of contract is such that it
reflects an intent to cause a moral damage, the obligee must be granted
recovery for such damage. That conclusion must prevail even in the
context of a business or commercial contract, because situations of that
sort are governed by the nature of the breach and not the nature of the
contract. Louisiana courts support that conclusion. Thus, when the breach
of a contract to build a sawmill was accompanied by threats of great bodily
harm to the other party and his employees, plaintiff was allowed recovery
for the outrage to his feelings.77
75. See Edwards v. Butler, 203 So. 2d 90 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1967); American
Steel Bldg. Co. v. Brezner, 158 So. 2d 623 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963); Mayeux,
Bennett, Hingle Ins. Agency, Inc. v. So. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 148 So. 2d 771 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1963); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Jones, 47 So. 2d 359 (La. App.
2d Cir. 1950)..But see Morein v. G.J. Deville Lumber Co., 215 So. 2d 208 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1968) (no recovery for damages to good will and loss of profits because such
damage was doubtful).
76. See Daguano v. Brady, 242 So. 2d 302 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1970). See also
Griffin v. Hunt Tool Co., 286 F. Supp. 402 (E.D. La.), aff'd. 412 F.2d 328 (5th Cir.
1968); Fassitt v. United T.V. Rental, Inc., 297 So. 2d 283 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974);
Kogos v. Rittiner, 228 So. 2d 62 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1969); Cooper v. Christensen,
212 So. 2d 154 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
77. Enders v. Skannal, 35 La. Ann. 1000 (1883). See also Fontenot v. Magnolia
Petroleum Co., 227 La. 866, 80 So. 2d 845 (1955); Johnson v. Levy, 118 La. 447, 43
MORAL DAMAGES
The same solution prevails at common law when a breach of contract
reflects wanton or reckless conduct by an obligor, though the tort approach
is not absent from the rationale of decisions rendered under that system.75
Special Circumstances Surrounding a Contract
Moral damages must be granted for the breach of contracts which,
though not of the kind contemplated in article 1934(3) of the Louisiana
Civil Code, either in its strict or its broad interpretation, are nevertheless
surrounded by peculiar circumstances calling for special care in the ren-
dering of an expected performance. Thus, a contract to have a suit of
clothes cleaned and pressed may be regarded as one for the satisfaction of
the economic interest of preserving the garments, whatever their cost. If
the cleaned clothes were intended to be worn at the owner's wedding,
however, that circumstance, known to the other party, casts a different
light on the contract.79 The situation becomes even more peculiar if the
clothes involved are of an unusually large size, so as to fit a person of great
weight for whom suitably fitting clothes are difficult to find.8" Likewise, a
contract for the furnishing of several custom-made pieces of clothing may
So. 46 (1907); American Steel Building Co. v. Brezner, 158 So. 2d 623 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1%3).
78. See 5 A. CORBIN, supra note 20, at 427-37. See also Simons v. Busby, 119
Ind. 13, 21 N.E. 451 (1888) (mental anguish damages were recovered in compensa-
tion for plaintiff's "wounded feelings and dishonor" after defendant's callous
breach of promise to marry); Aaron v. Ward, 203 N.Y. 351, 96 N.E. 736 (1911)
(defendant breached his contract with plaintiff by ejecting him from a bath house
and recovery was allowed for the "indignity"); Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134,
233 P. 299 (1925) (the court granted damages in view of the fact that defendant
refused to release possession of a dead body in order to coerce payment of
plaintiff's daughter's preexisting debt).
79. In Mitchell v. Shreveport Laundries, Inc., 61 So. 2d 539 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1952), plaintiff delivered a suit for cleaning with the information that he was to be
married on an upcoming date and wanted the suit back by that date; the suit was lost
and never returned.
80. Id. at 539-40. Cf. Rembert v. Fenner & Beane, 175 So. 116 (La. App. Orl.
Cir. 1937) (on rehearing of a suit between brokers of securities for mental worry,
annoyance, and inconvenience and injury to plaintiff's reputation, caused by de-
fendant's wrongful closing of plaintiff's account, the court reversed and remanded
the case to determine whether the parties had contemplated such damages in the
event of this type of breach); Garner v. Burnstein, 1 La. App. 19 (1934) (a milliner
who failed to deliver a hat for which he had been paid, thereby causing the
purchaser to appear at a dinner party in an inappropriate costume, was not held
liable for damages for mental anguish since he had not been advised of the impor-
tance of the hat as a part of a special outfit to be worn at that party, distinguishing
the case of Lewis v. Holmes). See note 92, infra.
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be regarded as one for the satisfaction of the very material need of
adequately covering the body. It is different however if such clothes are a
bride's trousseau, and that fact is known to the other party--and it
invariably will be known, since one of the garments is, precisely, a
wedding dress. 81
In that sort of situation the special surrounding circumstances reveal
an unmistakable emotional involvement of the obligee which calls for
special care in the rendering of the obligor's performance, to the exclusion
of that fault which is only slight in the terms of article 3556(13) of the
Louisiana Civil Code. 2 Furthermore, the obligor's knowledge of the
special circumstances makes the obligee's disappointment, humiliation
and embarrassment a foreseen, besides being a direct, consequence of the
breach, a damage which must be compensated under article 1934(1) of the
Louisiana Civil Code. Recovery would be granted under such circum-
stances at common law also, under the name of special damages.
Louisiana courts have accepted that conclusion and granted recovery
for moral damages where a contract is surrounded by peculiar emotional
overtones. Contracts for the transmission of messages relating an
emergency or a death, or for the handling of dead bodies, belong in the
same category as those discussed above. 83 In such situations, indeed, the
81. Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903).
82. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3556(13):
Fault.-There are in law three degrees of faults: the gross, the slight and the
very slight fault. The gross is that which proceeds from inexcusable negligence
or ignorance; it is considered as nearly equal to fraud. The slight fault is that
want of care which a prudent man usually takes of his business. The very slight
fault is that which is excusable, and for which no responsibility is incurred.
See also 2 S. LITVINOFF, supra note 6, at 348-53.
83. Cases allowing recovery for mental anguish resulting from the intentional or
negligent mishandling of dead bodies include Cary v. Lima, Salmon & Tull Mor-
tuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1959); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188
(Fla. App. 1950); Alderman v. Ford, 146 Kan. 698, 72 P.2d 981 (1937); Hale v.
Bonner, 82 Tex. 33, 17 S.W. 605 (1891). See also Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Crumpton, 138 Ala. 632, 36 So. 517 (1903); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Redding, 100
Fla. 495, 129 So. 743 (1930); Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 62
N.W. 1 (1895). In So Relle v. Western Union Tel. Co., 55 Tex. 308(1881), recovery
was allowed in the case of negligent transmission of a death message. The same
result would be reached in Louisiana by direct application of article 1934(3) of the
Louisiana Civil Code. See Graham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, 34 So.
91 (1903). Cf. French v. Ochsner Clinic, 200 So. 2d 371 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ
refused, 251 La. 34, 202 So. 2d 652 (1967); Blanchard v. Brawley, 75 So. 2d 891 (La.
App. Ist Cir. 1954); Leleux v. Viator, 55 So. 2d 662 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1952) (where
upon similar facts, moral damages were granted on a tort basis).
MORAL DAMAGES
obligee's emotional state is as manifest as the obligor's knowledge of the
special circumstances is obvious.84
Special Circumstances Surrounding a Breach
Regardless of its nature and of the special circumstances that sur-
round it, a contract may be breached in a manner that warrants the granting
of recovery for moral damages. That is so when the breach itself, not
precisely the contract, is surrounded by circumstances 'such that the ob-
ligor cannot ignore that some form of mental suffering will result for the
obligee. That takes place, for instance, when, after the pertinent charge
has been paid, admission to a theater is refused to a patron on the grounds
of his physical condition as an invalid.85 The fact that such an incident is
witnessed by the patron's spouse and several lady employees of the
establishment sufficiently establishes that a person in the condition of the
patron cannot but experience embarrassment and mortification as such a
refusal adds to the already heavy burden of his infirmity6 In a situation of
that sort the moral injury is neither caused by the fact of the breach, nor
determined by the nature of the violated contract; rather it is effected by
the manner in which the breach is incurred, by the circumstances that
surround it. Had the plaintiff been given a polite and sympathetic explana-
tion, in the privacy of an office, that for reasons of safety he could not be
admitted to the theater, a breach of the contract might still have taken
place, but the circumstances giving rise to the moral injury, resulting in
84. Where death messages or dead bodies are involved, rather than focusing on
surrounding circumstances, the court might find the contract to be of a special
nature. See note 74, supra. That approach is prevented, however, by the language
in which article 1934(3) has been couched, unless the expression "intellectual
enjoyment" is very broadly interpreted to mean the gratification of any
noneconomic interest. A reference to special surrounding circumstances, instead,
seems a more realistic manner of bringing rule and facts together.
85. See Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, Inc., 207 La. 835, 22 So. 2d 189 (1945). In
this most interesting decision the court said:
Obviously, therefore, the distinction between the law of this state and that of
most of the other jurisdictions, relative to the right of a theatre ticket purchaser
to recover for mental suffering upon the proprietor's breach of contract with-
out just cause, is found in the kind and character of the elements to be
considered in the assessment of damages. In Louisiana consideration is to be
given not only to pecuniary factors but also to intellectual or mental elements, in
connection with the last of which recovery for humiliation and embarrassment
is allowed, these constituting actual and legal damages.
Id. at 192 (emphasis added). That language clearly supports a broad interpretation
of article 1934(3).
86. Id. at 192-93.
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humiliation, would have been absent. A comparable situation, where the
same conclusion must obtain, takes place when a contract to provide
medical services is breached in spite of repeated notice, through special
messenger, that a child is very ill and the presence of a doctor is im-
mediately needed.87 It is the same when a contract for sanitary services is
negligently performed by allowing poisonous substances to remain within
the reach of children and the defaulting party fails to disclose the nature of
the poison after a child has ingested it, thereby hindering the administra-
tion of proper emergency treatment. 88 In those cases also, a breach
incurred in the absence of such surrounding circumstances might not have
caused a moral injury and might therefore have prevented such an award.
Situations where vexation and humiliation are caused by the forceful
repossession of property without the aid of a court belong in the same
category. 9
When a breach occurs in such a context, the surrounding circum-
stances make the mental suffering of the disappointed obligee a foreseen
consequence of the obligor's failure to perform and give rise to the kind of
damages recoverable under article 1934(1) of the Louisiana Civil Code.
When damages for mental suffering are recoverable because of spe-
cial circumstances surrounding the contract, such damages are foreseeable
at the moment the contract is made. When recovery must be granted
because of circumstances surrounding the breach, the moral damages are,
or should have been, foreseeable at the moment of the breach. Neverthe-
less, a breach that is incurred in the context of special surrounding
circumstances is very close to a breach in bad faith, of the kind already
discussed. That is the reason why recovery must be granted though the
damages become foreseeable only at the moment of the breach.
87. Jiles v. Venus Community Center Benev. Mut. Aid Ass'n, 191 La. 803, 186
So. 342 (1939).
88. Holland v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 135 So. 2d 145 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1961). When dealing with plaintiff's charge of negligence on the defendant's insured
exterminating company, the decision, in part, sounds in tort. However, the determi-
nation also rests clearly upon the breach of an implied provision of the contract,
under which the defendant should know the nature and composition of the poison to
be used.
89. Van Wren v. Flynn, 34 La. Ann. 1158 (1882); Lafleur v. Sylvester, 135 So.
2d 91 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962); Johnson v. Modern Furniture and Appliance Co., 76
So. 2d 338 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1955); Blaman v. Gulf Furniture Co., 16 So. 2d 561 (La.
App. Orl. Cir. 1944); Burgess v. Katz, 10 La. App. 355, 120 So. 526 (Orl. Cir. 1929);
Reed v. Shreveport Furniture Co., 7 La. App. 134 (2d Cir. 1927); Lalonier v. Philip
Werlein Co., 13 Orl. App. 235 (1916).
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MORAL DAMAGES ARE COMPENSATORY
In the words of Louisiana courts, "In this State, mental anguish is
recognized as a distinct element of damages and not merely an incident to
be taken into consideration in addition to pecuniary loss. Such damages
are considered as actual or compensatory."0 The idea, no doubt, is to
signify that an award for moral damages is neither vindictive nor exem-
plary. That follows naturally from traditional views according to which the
reason why damages are granted to the victim of a breach is to make
compensation for a loss or to restore the balance broken by the obligor's
failure to perform. Such views still prevail, although, with great candor, at
least one eminent French writer has asserted that a shade of punishment
taints every award of moral damages. 9
Be this as it may, the idea expressed by the Louisiana courts must be
taken to mean that, in order to grant recovery for moral damages, that
which must be taken primarily into account is not the obligor's conduct but
its effect upon the obligee, even though the former may never be entirely
overlooked in order to ascertain the latter. That some sort of mental
suffering for plaintiff resulted from defendant's breach must therefore be
shown. A plaintiff, however, does not have to show that any unusual state
of depression was caused by the breach, or that psychiatric help was
needed. If that was indeed the case, he would establish good grounds to
recover for "material" rather than "moral" damage. It suffices for him to
show circumstances indicative that as a consequence of the breach, a
negative impact upon his emotions could not have been avoided by any
normal person in plaintiff's position. As established by the Louisiana
jurisprudence, it is from these circumstances that the court proceeds to
weigh the obligee's disappointment.92 It then follows that moral damages
90. Jiles v. Venus Community Center Benev. Mut. Aid Ass'n., 191 La. 803,
812-13, 186 So. 342, 345 (1939). See also Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, Inc., 207 La.
835, 846, 22 So. 2d 189, 192 (1945) ("recovery for humiliation and embarrassment is
allowed, these constituting actual and legal damages"); Graham v. Western Union
Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069, 1074, 34 So. 91, 93 (1903) ("mental pain and suffering, as to
their existence, are certainly as actual, clear, and positive as are intellectual enjoy-
ment and gratification, and the former are as susceptible of being ascertained and
gauged as the latter"); Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 1034, 34 So. 66, 68 (1903)
(damages for humiliation and disappointment were found to be "within the contem-
plation of the parties in entering into the contract").
91. See G. RIPERT, LA REGLE MORAL DANS LES OBLIGATIONS CIVILES 242, 345
(4th ed. 1949).
92. In Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 1034, 34 So. 66, 68 (1903), the court
stated, "In computing the damages the allowance must be restricted to what may
reasonably be held to have been within the contemplation of the parties in entering
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are compensatory in the sense that, under an express provision of the
Louisiana Civil Code, the "intellectual" or "mental" element must be
taken into account in awarding damages. 93 As the third paragraph of
article 1934 of the Louisiana Civil Code clearly states, great discretion is
vested in the court and jury for the assessment of such damages.
COMPARATIVE EXCURSUS WITH A VIEW TO CODE REVISION
A survey of civil codes in general shows that specific provisions
concerning moral damages in contract are sparse. 94 Through a recent
amendment, however, the Argentine Civil Code now provides: "In cases
of contractual liability, the court may hold a party to the reparation of the
moral damage he has caused, according to the nature of the facts giving
rise to his liability and also according to the circumstances of the case." 95
Argentine law thus has gone a step beyond the Swiss law where one article
of the Code of Obligations allows reparation of the moral damage resulting
from tort and another provides that the rules governing quasi-delictual
liability are, by analogy, applicable to contract.'
Such views are worthy of being taken into account for a revision of
the Louisiana Civil Code.
into the contract. The contract was to furnish the dresses in time for the wedding on
the 19th. D.H. Holmes must be held to have known that, if the dresses were not
finished by that day, the bride would be keenly disappointed. In gauging this
disappointment of the bride the surrounding circumstances must, as a matter of
course, be considered ...... In Graham v. Western Union Tel. Co., 109 La. 1069,
1074, 34 So. 91, 93 (1903), while remanding a case after finding a cause of action in
the failure of the telegraph company to deliver a message to a mother announcing
the mortal illness and approaching death of a son the court asserted, "The existence
of mental suffering by a parent for the loss of a child is a fact so universal and
general that it also may be fairly assumed and recognized as existing in any given
case.
93. See Vogel v. Saenger Theatres, Inc., 207 La. 835, 845-46, 22 So. 2d 189, 192
(1945). See note 85, supra, for the court's rationale.
94. See article 2059 of the Italian Civil Code of 1942 and article 2105(2) of the
Ethiopian Civil Code of 1960, both providing that recovery for moral damages may
be granted only where the law so provides. The two codes are silent where recovery
of such damages in contract cases is concerned.
95. Argentine Civil Code of 1869, art. 522, as amended by Public Act No.
17,711 of 1968.
96. Swiss Code of Obligations of 1881, arts. 49, 99.
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